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Models for Foresight Use in 
International Development
Alun Rhydderch
Abstract This article sets out the components of the foresight approach 
that has been adopted by many governments in the developed world, 
and identifies elements of this ‘dominant’ approach that may hinder 
its uptake in developing countries. Instead, it suggests that a less rigid, 
more exploratory and normative approach may be better suited to many 
developing country contexts. With reference to the writings and practice of 
the creator of ‘la prospective’, Gaston Berger, it argues for an attitude that 
combines bold and inclusive thinking about how to create better futures 
with the pragmatic engagement with political and administrative systems 
that can help bring these about.
Keywords: prospective, horizon scanning, normative, participative.
1 Introduction: foresight practice and discipline
Foresight has been defined as ‘the ability to judge correctly what is going 
to happen in the future and plan your actions based on this knowledge’ 
(see dictionary definition in Box 1). We recognise this instinctively as a 
useful life skill. We all have it, to some degree. It helps us survive, avoid 
trouble, and achieve our goals.
The practice of  foresight requires scaling up this ability from the 
individual to the group level. By engaging more people to judge what 
might happen, we fill knowledge gaps, and can draw on a wider range 
of  understandings of  the factors that will shape the future. Foresight 
practice often includes oral exchanges in the form of  interviews, group 
discussions and workshops. These enable the surfacing of  underlying 
assumptions and the sharing of  tacit knowledge – intuitions as well 
as facts. Such exchanges provide a rich source of  new ideas while 
expanding the collective knowledge pool.
The discipline of  foresight, through its tools and techniques, provides 
a structured and systematic way to harness a range of  knowledge, 
experience and intuition located in different people and places. This is 
useful to generate better judgement – through a collective process – on 
what might happen in the future and how to prepare for it.
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This kind of  judgement has an obvious outlet in strategy formation and 
policymaking. When carried out in a government context, the term 
‘strategic foresight’ is increasingly used to call attention to the role foresight 
can play in improving strategic planning and policymaking processes.
The dominant foresight method that has evolved during the past 
60 years in the government and corporate domains has demonstrated 
its value and is increasingly accepted (see Section 2). It has done so 
by integrating existing sources of  knowledge and generating new 
knowledge and insights. By bringing these different sources together, 
foresight enhances strategic policymaking and planning processes.
Box 1 Definitions of ‘foresight’ and ‘horizon scanning’
Foresight (dictionary definition of  common meaning): ‘The 
good judgment to think and plan before an event, so that you 
are prepared for whatever may happen.’1
‘Horizon Scanning is the systematic outlook to detect early signs 
of  potentially important developments. These can be weak 
(or early) signals, trends, wild cards or other developments, 
persistent problems, risks and threats, including matters at the 
margins of  current thinking that challenge past assumptions.’ 
(Cuhls 2015, drawing on 2005 definition by UK Horizon 
Scanning Centre)
‘Strategic foresight is the ability to create and sustain a variety 
of  high quality forward views and to apply the emerging 
insights in organisationally useful ways; for example, to detect 
adverse conditions, guide policy, shape strategy; to explore 
new markets, products and services.’ (Slaughter 1997)
Scenario: ‘an internally consistent view of  what the future 
might turn out to be – not a forecast but one possible future 
outcome.’ (Porter 1985)
Source: Author’s own.
This article argues that this dominant model of  foresight is also 
responsible for the limited application of  foresight in a number of  other 
fields. Taking examples from the field of  international development, it 
will consider why foresight has had difficulty establishing itself  in some 
fields. By looking at successful projects in international development, the 
article will then make the case for alternative foresight approaches. It 
will conclude by suggesting further avenues for the expansion of  the use 
of  foresight in international development as well as in other fields that 
have so far attracted less foresight interest or success.
2 The dominant model of foresight
Although many developed countries include foresight as one of  their 
planning or policy tools, even in these countries the role of  foresight is 
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still often contested, and national foresight units or programmes rarely 
benefit from stable institutional support or budgets.
2.1 Characteristics of the dominant foresight model
With this important caveat, the foresight model practised most widely 
at the national government level in developed countries is outlined 
below. It is beyond the scope of  this article to consider why this 
model has become dominant.2 The model does, however, present 
two characteristics that make it a ‘good fit’ for developed country 
governments. First, it lends itself  to the creation of  risk or threat 
scenarios, the analysis of  which can lead to the development of  
policies for dealing with these risks or threats. One of  the reasons for 
the prevalence of  this characteristic is the influence of  long-range 
planning approaches used in the defence sector (for procurement or 
force development), and the military (scenarios in military strategy), 
which tend to be threat-focused. Second, it adopts a neutral, detached, 
‘evidence-based’ and ‘objective’ stance towards the data that form the 
basis for its analysis. The influence here is ‘technology foresight’ – a 
relatively stable strand of  foresight practice in some developed country 
governments since the 1970s – which tends to take a probabilistic and 
deterministic approach to forecasting, using tools such as Delphi studies 
and roadmapping.
The first of  these characteristics may reflect a sense that developed 
countries have ‘more to lose’ than developing countries. Their citizens, 
and therefore their politicians are likely to have a more risk-averse, 
protective attitude than those of  developing countries. The second 
characteristic, viewed positively, reflects the penetration of  the sciences 
(social and natural) into the policymaking processes of  governments in 
more developed countries. Foresight, if  it wishes to play a role in the 
policymaking process, is expected to meet these high (scientific) standards.
Viewed negatively though, the requirement to produce evidence, 
and the mistrust of  judgements or opinions construed as value-laden 
(‘biased’) can be seen as part of  a strategy of  risk avoidance on the part 
of  civil servants. In a culture that rewards clear, well-founded advice, 
the official charged with foresight activities is from the outset on shaky 
ground. ‘Evidence of  the future’ is hard to come by, while facts and data 
from authoritative (scientific) sources provide a crutch that can help him 
or her navigate this terrain more surely.
2.2 Structure of the dominant model
Most foresight exercises contain the following three elements:
 l A scoping or horizon-scanning stage
 l A stage of  analysis and ordering of  the data from the first stage, often 
involving scenarios
 l An ‘implications’ stage: what does this analysis mean for the topic 
being investigated?
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A fourth element, important for ensuring both the impact of  foresight 
projects and the stability of  the foresight function, is a stage of  
‘embedding’ or ‘integrating’ foresight into the organisation once the 
exercise (or series of  exercises) has been completed.
These elements, except for the last one which is often neglected, are 
common not just to ‘developed country foresight’; they can also be found 
in one form or another in approaches that are more open or ‘normative’ 
(see Section 5 for more on the normative approach). The particularity 
of  the dominant model lies rather in (a) the types of  data considered 
valuable to collect at the scoping/horizon-scanning stage; and (b) the 
way this data is analysed and ordered at the second stage.3 Specifically, 
developed countries tend to have a preference for authoritative data 
sources that can be extrapolated or modelled into the future, and, where 
such data are not available, for consensus among experts in specialist 
fields, generally from academia. Also, at the analysis and ordering stage, 
there is a tendency in developed countries to commission or produce 
scenarios that present future risks and threats, rather than opportunities.
2.3 Participation in the dominant model
In developed countries, participation in foresight processes is often 
restricted to experts from academia and policy officials. The private 
sector may be invited to join (generally through industry bodies such as 
trade associations), while civil society is less often represented.
3 Foresight in developing countries
It is an attractive idea that foresight should help guide a country’s 
development. As described above, there are enough common elements 
in the foresight approaches used by developed countries to constitute 
a ‘package’ that can be proposed to developing countries.4 In the past, 
international organisations have played a role in sharing foresight 
experience and expertise with the developing world (for example, 
UNDP and UNIDO5 supported several developing countries in the 
1990s). More recently UNDP, through its Global Centre for Public 
Service Excellence (GCPSE), has begun to provide support for foresight 
activities as part of  its mission to improve public sector capability.
Singapore’s rapid transition to developed country status, as well as its 
widespread and effective use of  foresight, helps explain why UNDP 
chose the country to host the GCPSE. Foresight exercises supported by 
GCPSE have recently been conducted in Tonga, Rwanda and Turkey. 
The activity of  this unit is likely to receive a boost from the recent 
adoption of  the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): foresight has 
been identified as an approach that, if  adopted more widely, could 
contribute to achieving SDG 16 (governance).
However, Havas, Schartinger and Weber (2010) point out that ‘foresight 
is costly in terms of  time and money in general, and this can be a decisive 
factor for emerging economies, in particular’. And in a section on ‘the 
political economy of  foresight and development’, Van de Pol et al. define 
the challenge of  implementing foresight in developing countries:
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While most countries apply futures thinking and strategic planning to 
some extent in their national policies, there is little evidence to suggest any 
widespread use of  foresighting at the national level in most developing 
countries. Likely reasons for this include limited capacities in resources, 
skills and knowledge, organisation, politics and power and/or incentives. 
[…] Conditions are even less conducive in fragile states (2014: 16).
One way to increase the use of  foresight would therefore be to improve 
economic management to enable investment in the missing resources, 
skills and knowledge; reduce reliance on foreign aid; and increase 
political legitimacy. Such steps might be accompanied by a transfer of  
know-how from developed countries where ‘vigorous regional futures 
and foresighting activities are ongoing’ (ibid.: 17).
But this is a challenging list of  requirements and begs the question, is 
there an alternative to the state-led and government-funded foresight 
approach that might be less costly and more flexible? An alternative is 
raised in the UNDP paper:
Where less formal or institutionalised regional foresighting is being 
conducted, research and practice continues to be carried out by 
independent organisations, academics, practitioners and global 
communities (ibid.: 17).
This introduces the key observation that not all foresight is state-
supported. Given the challenge in developing countries of  directing 
state funding towards long-term goals when there is pressure to address 
current needs,6 alternative approaches may be required. Specifically, 
the independent organisations, academics, practitioners and global 
communities undertaking the less formal or institutionalised foresighting 
may be of  particular value. Such activities are often supported by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) or foundations, and the foresight 
approach taken tends to be different from that supported by government 
in ways that, we will argue in the next sections, potentially makes it 
more suitable for addressing some developing country challenges.
4 Constraints of the dominant foresight model
Here, with a particular focus on its use within international 
development, some limitations of  the dominant model of  foresight are 
identified. Alternatives approached that address these limitations are set 
out in Section 5.
4.1 Method, evidence and the pull of the sciences
Loveridge, Keenan and Saritas (2010) describe foresight processes as 
being ‘method-bound’. This attachment to method, and an array of  
tools and techniques, can be understood in part as a response to the 
need to make foresight ‘rigorous’ and to produce reliable evidence. The 
New Public Management (NPM) approach7 had a strong influence on 
governments throughout the world during the 1990s; from an NPM 
perspective, policymaking is (or should be) a rational activity that 
processes well-defined inputs (i.e. evidence) to reach clear conclusions. 
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To contribute to these policy processes, the expectation is that foresight 
should provide such inputs.
Yet the use of  any foresight approach, given the irreducible uncertainty 
of  the future and the infinite number of  factors that will influence it, 
must rely to a considerable extent on discernment and judgement. 
Despite this, it has been hard to resist the pull of  standardised methods 
when justifying and using foresight in policy settings.
A second temptation has been to make the case for foresight in the 
language of  science. Foresight is an integrative discipline that uses 
information, data and evidence from a number of  different disciplines 
and sources. Many of  these can be categorised as belonging to the social 
sciences, but some – for example, environmental data, demographic 
forecasts and economic projections – incorporate precise measurement 
and data-driven modelling, associating them with the ‘hard’ sciences 
and giving them particular currency in the policy world.
Not only is this science ‘badging’ often misleading, it has arguably 
also constrained the scope of  enquiry of  some foresight programmes 
by scaling back exploratory, hypothesis-driven projects in favour of  
exercises that resemble academic research projects (and that therefore 
could be funded under regular academic programmes).
4.2 Neutrality and objectivity
In government organisations in particular, and in many other settings 
in which foresight exercises are carried out, neutrality (or lack of  bias) 
is either expected or mandated. This expectation applies not just to the 
facilitator of  the exercise, but also to participants, whose knowledge, 
ideas or views on the future are supposed to be detached from opinions, 
beliefs and ideologies. Experts are generally invited to participate in 
such exercises on the understanding that they provide this objectivity, 
but even when lay contributors are invited, it is assumed that they 
will participate in expert ‘mode’, i.e. by providing facts rather than 
opinions. Not only is neutrality in such a setting nearly impossible (even 
for facilitators and civil servants), striving to achieve it also reduces the 
space for uncovering interesting and informative elements shaping the 
future that a foresight process should explore.
4.3 Compatible cultures: selection and self-selection
Finally, even the most experienced practitioners of  foresight, implementing 
the best designed processes, will run up against the issue of  who is involved, 
who is ‘in the room’. This is not simply a question of  having a diverse and 
representative group of  people at a workshop, or ensuring that experts do 
not exclude voices that challenge the prevailing view or look at questions 
from a different perspective. It is more fundamentally about knowledge, 
capability and power. This is already a major (and under-investigated) issue 
for well-funded exercises carried out in developed countries. The challenge 
is in many cases greater and harder to resolve in developing countries, 
where there may be even more pressure to express a view consistent with 
that of  a particular group, whether social, professional or political.
(Endnotes)
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Linked to this is the question of  whether a country or culture will 
embrace or reject the foresight approach. What to developed country 
administrations (particularly Western and democratic) is for the most 
part viewed as a potentially useful complement to the policy and 
strategy toolkit, may to other governments appear as an unwelcome 
challenge to their legitimacy and control. Part of  the answer can already 
be found by looking at the way regions such as South East Asia or Latin 
America have adopted approaches to foresight that differ from the 
dominant model described above (see EFMN 2009 and Keenan and 
Popper 2008). But even in other cases, it is worth asking whether any 
kind of  foresight approach is likely to gain purchase outside an elite 
group. In some cases, a government’s sponsorship of  a foresight exercise 
may be perceived as an attempt to influence political debate and policy 
to the advantage of  one party or interest group or another.
5 Alternative approaches
What then are the alternative models that may be more suited to ‘non-
natural’ foresight territory, perhaps because they are better understood 
outside elite circles, more flexible, or more in tune with the social and 
political culture of  a country or context into which it is desired to 
introduce foresight? This section will consider two approaches that have 
already been implemented successfully, and which may also point to ways 
of  conducting foresight in countries less suited to the dominant model.
5.1 La prospective
‘La prospective’ is a foresight approach created by Gaston Berger, a French 
philosopher, industrialist, and senior government official between 
the 1930s and the end of  the 1950s. Berger developed the prospective 
approach – or ‘attitude’ as he called it – to free the pursuit of  better 
futures (political, scientific and human) from what he saw as the drag or 
dead weight of  bureaucratic process (Berger 1967).
As a senior official in the French education ministry, who also travelled 
extensively (particularly to the United States) as a cultural ambassador, 
Berger had a great deal of  respect for the role of  the state, but saw its 
instruments as insufficient to achieve the potential for positive change 
in the world characterised by rapid technological change and economic 
growth following the Second World War. Berger observed that when 
planning the future of  a country or sector, too often means were decided 
on before goals were set, and that when this happened, the means would 
often dictate (or overly influence) the goals. As Durance (2010) puts it, 
‘Man may thus give up a better condition, considered utopian, because 
the means required have not yet been discovered.’ A better approach 
would be to:
[…] bring together those who can determine what is desirable with 
those who can determine what is possible. The idea of  picturing 
possible worlds in broad strokes would not only enlighten judgment 
but also inform it early enough so that a decision would be efficient 
(ibid.).
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This idea of  ‘picturing possible worlds in broad strokes’ is recognisable 
to us as the creation of  ‘visions’ of  the future – now a standby of  
corporate consulting, even if  less frequently used by governments. This 
vision creation was and is an essential part of  the prospective approach, 
but was paired with an extremely rigorous, expert-led process to align 
policy with these possible futures.
Berger commanded respect in the French administration and his ideas 
were highly influential. The first French five-year plan launched in 1965 
was strongly influenced by prospectiviste ideas, and by the end of  the 
1960s prospective units were active in all parts of  the French government. 
There were also exchanges in both directions between France and 
the United States during the 1960s. While the prospectivistes and their 
partners in the similarly-minded Futuribles group were impressed with 
the future thinkers in thinktanks such as the RAND Institute and 
adopted some of  their approaches, the intellectual traffic was two-
way. The dominant foresight approach that emerged in the 1970s 
(particularly thanks to Frenchman Pierre Wack’s influence at Shell) is 
strongly marked with the prospective stamp.8
This separation of  ambitious vision from the means necessary to achieve 
it offers the chance to develop processes that harness the big ideas of  
imaginative people from all walks of  life. In a second stage, these ideas 
are handed over to officials to evaluate their ability to implement them, 
and to identify what resources and instruments would be needed.
The prospective approach has been influential in many countries, 
particularly in Europe and Latin America. Whether drawing or not 
explicitly on prospective thinking, many policymakers in developing 
countries have been attracted by the idea of  developing a vision of  the 
future as a prosperous, stable place. One such example of  a vision-
based exercise cited by Van de Pol et al. (2014) is that of  Botswana, 
now one of  Africa’s most stable countries, relatively free of  corruption 
and with a good human rights record. The national vision for the 
year 2016 exercise was followed by implementation of  a series of  
measures identified in a backcasting process.9 A Long Term Vision for 
Botswana was published in 1997; the document informed decision and 
policymaking by identifying major challenges and roadblocks, and the 
strategies required to deal with them.
5.2 Broad and ‘bottom-up’ participation
Bingley (2014: 9) (and citing Ramos, Mansfield and Priday 2012) sets 
out the charge:
[…] in describing processes as ‘participative’, documentation 
of  foresight initiatives often fails to distinguish between expert 
participation and ordinary citizen participation; [what is needed is 
to] make futures thinking a popular process, and to allow futures 
thinking ‘to reflect the needs of  the vast majority of  people, rather 
than the interests of  the few.’
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Foresight shares the challenge of  representation and legitimacy with 
many ‘community’ processes that aspire to speak on behalf  of  a group 
of  people. In some ways foresight can be seen to be in a particularly 
difficult position in this regard, since a common view is that to express a 
valid opinion on the future, one must belong to an expert community of  
some kind. There are, however, three reasons why a community process 
can be – and indeed has already proved itself  to be – a particularly 
good setting for foresight. The first and perhaps most important is 
that, particularly if  the process entails the creation of  a desired future, 
the people who will be part of  such a future ought to have the chance 
to express a view on what that future should be; an additional benefit 
being that they may also be inspired by that view. Secondly, the division 
of  society into those who create the structures and those who inhabit 
them – dominant in the time of  Berger – is today contested. The 
information and digital revolutions have, potentially at least, devolved 
agency from elites into the heart of  society. Those who come up with 
the ideas of  better futures will in some cases be in a position to help 
create them. Thirdly, coming together to discuss and agree common or 
shared goals, even if  agreement is not to be found on all matters, offers 
a way to bring people together, whether from within one community, or 
from across different (sometimes opposing) ones.
A powerful example of  a bottom-up approach is the series of  projects 
undertaken by the Society for International Development (SID) in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in East Africa.10 Barbara Heinzen, the lead 
facilitator for this work, described the scenarios developed by these 
exercises – in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and also for the East 
Africa region – as ‘public interest scenarios, concerned with developing 
skills and opportunities for public dialogue, facing uncertainty through 
collaborative learning processes, and developing capacity for political 
agreement’ (Heinzen 2004). They were designed to maximise ownership 
at the local and national level.
The reasons given for undertaking this series of  projects can be seen to 
be relevant to a number of  developing countries today:
SID’s own interest in exploring scenario exercises in Eastern Africa 
in the mid-1990s was driven largely by the fact that far-reaching 
structural adjustments were being undertaken in various countries with 
seemingly scant concern for long-term impacts and the choices that 
some of  these adjustments would inevitably foster (Bingley 2014: 19).
At the same time, Bingley’s account of  the Kenya scenarios process 
suggests why, while powerful, this type of  community-owned process with 
extensive public engagement does not take place regularly in developing 
countries. She suggests that ‘the Kenya scenarios were a conscious attempt 
at participative policymaking, in an effort to provide an alternative to 
undemocratic governance in Kenya’ (ibid.: 18). The activities of  NGOs, 
particularly when sponsored by foreign governments or NGOs, are often 
viewed with suspicion by governments in developing countries. For such 
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exercises to have an impact beyond the grass-roots level and influence the 
development of  national-level policy, it will generally be helpful, and often 
necessary, to obtain at least tacit government acceptance of  the initiative, 
and ideally to find active supporters among the political elites.
6 Way forward
The optimal role for governments, international institutions and NGOs 
who want to encourage and support the use of  foresight in developing 
countries, may therefore be to seek the best combination of  (a) support 
from developing country governments and (b) local NGO and civil 
society participation in foresight activities. This implies three elements 
of  support:
 l Advice to developing country governments on what they should (and 
should not) expect from foresight, and education of  a small team at 
ministry level that can act as the centre for commissioning foresight 
studies;
 l Identification of  existing foresight actors within a country and 
assessment of  their capabilities and the techniques they have adopted 
or developed; and
 l Brokering and supporting the development of  links between the 
foresight actors and government ministry, and helping to identify and 
design projects and other initiatives that benefit development.
One famous foresight initiative, the Mont Fleur scenarios,11 was strong 
on the first and third of  these elements (even if  the foresight process 
was led by outside actors and benefited from a very particular context). 
The SID approach described above was strong on the second element, 
bringing communities into the process, and made some headway in 
involving political actors.
There is certainly room for a range of  initiatives, and it is unlikely 
that the optimal combination of  these elements will be achievable in 
a majority of  cases. The easiest solution will often be to support the 
central government to put in place the dominant model described in 
Section 2, potentially even to provide the team to implement such a 
model. This article argues that such a solution should be resisted, and 
efforts made instead to encourage initiatives that involve local foresight 
actors (and participants) and produce outputs that are relevant to the 
concerns and aspirations of  the citizens of  the country.
7 Conclusion
This article suggests that there is a dominant foresight method and 
approach practised by developed country governments, and gives 
reasons why this approach emerged. It argues that this approach may 
not always be suited to a developing country context, and puts forward 
two alternative approaches, which have been adopted successfully in 
the past, and which it may be useful to revisit when designing foresight 
approaches in developing countries.
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The article concludes by proposing that the most promising way 
forward for foresight in developing countries may be to take inspiration 
from Gaston Berger’s prospective ideas from the 1950s. The challenge 
is to harness the energy and ideas of  creative minds, found in all parts 
of  society, and link them to a policymaking community at the national 
government level. To make this work policymakers must be open to 
receiving such forward-looking ideas and proposals from its citizens, and 
ready to transform them into implementable forward-looking policies 
and projects.
Notes
1 Macmillan Online Dictionary, www.macmillandictionary.com/ 
(accessed March 2016).
2 For more on national models within developed countries, see Kuosa 
(2011) and Rhydderch in Frank and Matyas (eds) (2013).
3 See for example Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre Toolkit (accessed 
at http://hsctoolkit.bis.gov.uk/index.htm) and Foresight HSC (2009).
4 The existence of  a dominant foresight model does not mean that 
there is necessarily a straightforward implementation schema for 
foresight in developed country contexts. For more on the options and 
trade-offs involved in designing an appropriate national-level foresight 
programme, see Rhydderch in Frank and Matyas (eds) (2013).
5 UNDP – United Nations Development Programme; UNIDO – 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
6 For example, the conundrum of  ‘services now versus institutional 
strengthening’ (Brinkerhoff 2007).
7 See Barzelay (2001).
8 What the foresight approach lost on arrival in the United States, 
probably because of  the corporate context in which it took root, was 
Berger’s insistence that the process had to start with a normative vision of  
a future, or set of  futures, that were considered desirable. The process 
of  coming up with this vision is central to the idea of  prospective, and 
Berger insisted that this should be independent of  and not subservient 
to the instruments, technologies and resources needed to achieve it.
9 See www.vision2016.co.bw.
10 Bingley (2014) provides a good summary of  the SID projects in East 
Africa. See also Harcourt and Muliro (2004).
11 The Mont Fleur process undertaken in 1991 is credited with helping 
South Africa emerge from its apartheid system without widespread 
violence or economic upheavals (see Kahane 1992).
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